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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Yugoslavia/Bulgaria

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE DISTR. 28 March 1949

SUBJECT An Analysis of Soviet Views on the
Tito-Cominform Problem

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There follows an analysis of the current status of the Yugoslav-Cominform situation with particular regard to the Soviet interest in this problem as prepared for the Italian General Staff:

1. "Events of notable importance could manifest themselves in the near future within Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union, during the most recent period, must have concluded that:
 - a. Tito's 'going to Canossa' is becoming less probable. It is to be concluded rather that he intends to depend on the West although he will conserve his autonomy and his ideology.
 - b. An internal uprising against Tito is to be excluded. In any choice between Tito and the Cominform, the majority of the Yugoslavs would select the former. The large majority of the armed forces would support Tito.
 - c. The physical suppression of Tito would be difficult in view of the security measures he has taken for his own person.
2. "For these reasons there is reason to believe that the Soviet Union has now turned to the expedient of striking at Tito where he is most vulnerable, that is, by raising the Macedonian question. Indications which support this conclusion are as follows:
 - a. The establishment of groups numbering from 1,500 to 2,000 Greek Rebels and Bulgarian Communists in the mountain regions of Pirin and around Nevrokop, Smolyan, Krumovgrad, Ivailovgrad and Zlatograd. Unconfirmed information indicates that the headquarters of these formations is at Razlog and under the command of a Soviet General Petrovski.*
 - b. The Commander of the Bulgarian First Army *(Sofia) was at Petric in Macedonia on 9 March. From this visit it could be inferred that there has been an increase in the armed forces of the Bulgarian Army in this zone.

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- c. An informer, who during this period, crossed the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier by train observed Yugoslav troops movements which he described as 'considerable'.
 - d. The loading in Albania of Soviet elements and material of undefined nature and quantity, but not considered to be large.
 - e. The removal of Markos, which resulted principally from the fact that he refused to agree to the violation of Greek territorial frontiers.
3. "The conclusion (of the analysis) is as follows:
- a. A manifestation of the above would bring Tito closer to the Anglo-Americans because of the necessity of supplies to sustain guerrilla actions. The dispatch of war materiel from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have ceased for some time and the Yugoslav reserves, particularly of ammunition, spare parts and fuels, are limited.
 - b. The establishment of a Macedonian state would be damaging for Italy because Albania would no longer be isolated but would be territorially contiguous with the Soviet satellites even if via the mediocre transport facilities of Macedonia.
 - c. The possession of Salonika by a Macedonian state would give the Soviet Union an outlet on the Aegean.
 - d. The conflict at first would be limited to guerrilla actions, but could enlarge into encounters between the regular Yugoslav and Bulgarian forces with unforeseeable consequences."

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Comment: Possibly General F.L. Petrovski.

Comment: General Todor Tochev.

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